

## **Management Model of Political Party and Legislative Faction in Policy Formulation: Case Study in Local Parliament of Sinjai Regency, Indonesia**

**Umar Congge<sup>1</sup>, Saiful Deni<sup>2\*</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Universitas Muhammadiyah Sinjai, Indonesia

<sup>2</sup>Universitas Muhammadiyah Maluku Utara, Indonesia

\*saifuldeni@ummu.ac.id

### **ABSTRACT**

This paper explores the partnership management model on local parliament (DPRD) formulation between factions and political parties. The study used a qualitative descriptive, which allows identifying the proof for the right interpretation. The research was conducted in Sinjai Regency, Indonesia, for three months in 2019. The study position includes both factions with informant determination through purposeful sampling of Sinjai Parliament. The informants involved in this study are membership and leadership of legislative seated political parties; chairman/deputy and DPRD members; chairman and party members; and secretary and staff of the DPRD. The sources of the data gathered in this study comprise both primary and secondary data. The result showed that the policy-making model adopted in Sinjai DPRD is less effective and cooperation between political parties and voters is weak. In contrast, there is an unclear paradigm of the relationship between political parties and factions. The policy development process needs to be refined by developing a new model governed in a precise regulation and converted into Parliament order. The partnership structure between factions and political parties in policy formulation needs to be established and strengthened. However, voters and political parties participation in the policy formulation is not a core actor but an aspiration to have feedback, recommendations, demands, or support from the community in the political management system, especially in the Sinjai Parliament. The study results contribute to improve the political management system of local parliament in Indonesia.

### **Keywords**

Local parliament, constituent role, people welfare, political parties, local government

### **Introduction**

The local legislative factions are an extension of the party and must establish ambitions towards the individuals they represent. The faction position as a political party organization within the DPRD should represent the people needs and play a key role in decision-making. It is a significant position, but it should not be done (Ziegenhain, 2008). The DPRD rules were regulating faction duties at the strategic level, not more specific tactical guidance for how the factions could carry out their obligations to maximize the authority (Tampubolon and Roma, 2017).

Each internal faction itself provides the execution mechanism. As an organizational roadmap, the working tool is created to ensure that the constituent aspirations are the foundation for decision formation in each faction. Their discrepancies culminated in the various faction tactical directives on their operational laws. It is also a faction obstacle that the DPRD is not optimally active. As a consequence, no simple norm remains. The faction must execute its tasks; since the old faction already has expertise in carrying out its faction duties that is the promise the new faction will copy the old faction job procedures of its faction (DiSalvo, 2010). Even to date, no study has been carried out that show past faction success is more substantial, for instance, by current factions. Therefore, studies need to explain what fractions are and shape baseline to measure

portions performance to see their representation, particularly in authority, to help optimize the DPRD performance of its responsibilities.

The critical issue led to the optimum position of the DPRD faction because no uniform model was governing the relationship between political parties and the groups representing them in the DPRD, so that all parties exercised their duties according to each respective understanding. Ideally, a group must have a natural system of interaction with its divisions. Often a limiting factor in the non-optimal functioning and alliance between political parties and their divisions in the DPRD is due to low potential for human capital, not well-ordered party systems, and disparities preferences between political parties and fractions.

The idea that coalitions proponent are a mix of many parties unable to form a complete party in the DPRD is another barrier to factions and political parties. Informing a combined party, they need to build a coalition such that there are various visions and missions, and priorities of the alliance members. The disparity in political direction due to disagreements in vision and purpose will undoubtedly make it impossible for faction members to share party proposals from various parties (Rosser et al., 2011).

The party has a strategic role in the negotiation stage of municipal control and budgeting when carrying out the DPRD duties and functions. It has strong jurisdiction, beginning at the arrangement level, draft legislation, regional budget, and issue inventory list debate. The group must have a good relationship with the party that supports it with the price to prevent a standoff of stagnation and knowledge. If it does not indicate that a paradigm would exist, decision making is inappropriate for the constituent need.

The rule of a faction in Article 80(1) of Indonesian Law No.17/2014 concerning Indonesian House of Representatives provides the DPRD optimization duties and authority, as well as the privileges and obligations of the DPRD member, constitutes a faction as a forum for the DPRD members. The party should also be interested in the optimization of the DPRD authority. The faction plays an essential role as an extension of the democratic parties in the DPRD political structure at the level of completeness, plenary meetings, and lobbying beyond the formal structures of the DPRD. The faction role will also guide any opinion or attitudes and decisions taken in general government policy. There is no statement or policy made by each political party leader without the consent or at least consultation. Centered on this condition, it is clear that factions and political parties do not sever links as channels of people ambitions for the two institution efficacy.

Ideally, in building networks and connections between factions and political parties, a transparent model must exist that governs healthy working relations between factions and parties based on the phenomenon mentioned above. The relationship structure that has so far been linked between factions and political parties appears to be focused on each party member expectations. There is an institutional sense that the involvement of the faction is merely a formality. Therefore, the present study examined the relationship management model between the factions and political parties in the Sinjai Regency with the research locus of the DPRD factions to explore more functions and roles of faction efficacy. The analysis aims to examine the efficiency relationship management model Sinjai Regency Parliament between factions and political parties.

## **Literature Review**

### **Concept of Representation in Politics**

In a representative democracy, the voters are choosing their members to make decisions on them in parliament. As a result of adopting representative democracy, the principle of the people representative responsibility and their constituent autonomy has arisen (Urbinati, 2011). Accountability ensures the people leaders must demonstrate their responsibility to those who have elected them to express their decision-making participation. Consequently, the question emerges as to whether the parliamentary government follows their communities when people decide (Esiason and public engagement in the Holmberg Parliament, 2017)? Public participation in parliament may be promoted through political parties or their factions through a representative democracy. There is apparent legal-procedural legitimacy for relationships across parliament. It is also unsuccessful since the formal mechanisms of representative democracy channeled by political parties or their electoral divisions often struggle to prioritize voter needs in decision-making. It is a decision-making process (Katharina et al., 2008).

There is no democratic sense of the definition of representation after the change to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, which comprises only political representatives and regional representatives, even though all members are directly elected. If the principles underpinning these representatives still obey the previous pattern, only participants are assumed to be electors. The reform process in Indonesia must begin by changing the focus and paradigm of the party role as a liaison, which is simultaneously an agency serving the people dealing with the state, replaced by open, fair, and accountable competition by figures-based roles.

Political representation theory is used to examine whether a faction is a society or a party. There are two classical hypotheses on legislative relationships with well-known members that are mandates and independence theory (Ranney, 1972). The holder of the mandate to realize the force is reflected in democratic power framework. In carrying out their responsibilities, members must have opinions, speak, and act in compliance with the mandate. Specific views are not allowed to be included in their representational credentials. The theory of freedom explains that in terms of being served, the representative considered it necessary to articulate his attitude and views on the problem faced without being firmly tied to the represented, gave him confidence as the representative (Bishin, 2009). The official judgment and behavior are then dictated by the delegate consideration, who pays attention to all things relevant to the issue at hand.

Gilbert Abcarian believes that there are four kinds of connections between members and others they serve (Abcarian, 1971). Firstly, the delegate operating as a trustee is free to respond or make judgments without thought based on his opinion and consult with his agent. Secondly, the delegate is the acting speaker; the representative here serves as the diplomat or agent of his representative; the representative always follows the representative orders to execute his duties. Thirdly, the representative acts as a politician; occasionally, the representative acts as a protector and sometimes courier. His behavior depends on the problem or material addressed. Fourth, the delegate behaves as a partisan, following the party plan desires, the symbolic acts here.

Indonesia adopted a multi-party structure during the reform period, a social regulation that gives rise to party division, making party opinion deeper, so that party elites govern its members. The

multi-party mechanism regulates members of the DPRD inadvertently. Under the boundaries of Robert Dahl definition of the social structure, the party system is one kind, namely the regulatory structure, which is social control (Dahl, 1957). According to Robert Michels, political parties or factions have even said that it is difficult to resist the rise of an oligarchic phenomenon (Michels, 1997). The party as an organization and process component is not necessarily the entirety of the members and, therefore, the party class. The acute technological need for leadership is the leading cause of oligarchy in political parties (Onuigbo and Eme, 2015). The number of political parties does not test country legitimacy; it indicates that more political parties do not imply a more democratic state. The norm widely used is that a government should follow the values of democracy in its administration.

The people elect their members in a parliamentary democracy and make decisions on them in parliament. The people representative responsibility and constituent autonomy are emerging due to the introduction of representative democracy. Accountability suggests that individuals must demonstrate their obligation to the individuals who have nominated them for inclusion in decision-making. However, the question emerges whether representative government meets people desires, preferences, or even their group interests when making decisions.

It is also a democratic institution in Indonesia, as in other democracies that must serve the people interests. It was confirmed in the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, which explicitly specifies political party representatives engaging in elected elections as a legislative body. Following the term parliament, originating from the expression *parle*, meaning to talk, so the role of communicating should be for members to express a voice it serves. For this cause, the parliament role was called by Daniel Dhakidae as the power of speech of the people (Onuigbo and Eme, 2015).

Talks regarding roles, obligations, and power cannot be separate from the structure and life of the Republic of Indonesia political system, which insists that it is a representative body of the people, made up of people directly elected and thus trusted by the people. In addition to having the legitimacy to serve the people needs, it must also, recognize the people wishes and be open to influence by carrying out its roles, duties, and jurisdiction.

In Indonesia, the reform movement must begin by shifting the emphasis and trend of party success as a liaison, which simultaneously represents the public in communicating with the state, replaced by figures-based positions by transparent equal and accountable competition. Moreover, it does not become an obstacle to the representative entity position and function, which optimizes the DPRD role and function.

### **History, Concepts, and Role of Faction in the DPRD**

A fraction of the word used to refer to political or party parties in parliament, besides factions, is often sometimes used for factions, clubs, and groups (Giannetti and Laver, 2005; Debus and Bräuninger, 2008). In faction terminology, party discipline elements must respect, party members must express party policy, and those that do not cooperate with party policies are threatened with their position. If party unity is upheld, so the presence of a group is necessary. The faction concept has been recognized since the interim era of 1950, despite the term flow known. Article

28(3) and paragraph (5) of the Provisional Standing Orders comprise the word faction. This term reappears in the Rules of Practice of 1959. Previous law clarified what the party meant, and then the 1959 laws included a detailed chapter on factions. During the 1960 Indonesian Mutual Cooperation, however, the word faction vanished. Only the word "gang" was used at the time. It lasted until the time 1964 and 1966, which besides being known as the 'Party,' also known as the 'Group.' The condition shifted from 1967 to 2009-2014, the faction phrase still used in the procedure rules. The faction's position is also becoming more reliable with the loading of clauses on the conditions of the faction in various procedure operations, such as the faction's quorum in consideration of the bill, including the faction in the deliberative body (BAMUS) and consultation sessions.

The faction position is specified DPRD Standing Orders and the Law of the Political Party and Parliament. In this clause, the factions have been strengthened from the old order to the reform period. In the early period (1950-1959), the New Order period (1966-1998), and the beginning of the Reformation era (1999-2004), the provisions on factions were only laid out in the Standing Orders. Still, the party was integrated into the Reformation era (2004 to date). For the period 2004-2009, the party provisions were laid out in the Standing Orders and entered for 2009-2014. The faction criteria are significant, and they have been registered in the Political Party Act; this indicates that the laws relating to the faction are becoming stricter.

The position of life and party cannot be differentiated from the political developments in Indonesia. The faction position would always shift as a result of this political growth. Based on the DPRD Standing Orders terms, it seems that the faction position has been improved since 1956. However, member role as representatives of the people is not diminished because the faction role is just the creation of incompleteness, not the fulfillment of their duties as DPRD members.

### **Policy Formulation Theory Study: Elite Models and Comprehensive Rational Models**

The research discusses two models used in the DPRD management policy formulation, that are the policy formulation using the elite model and a comprehensive logical model. The elite model departs from the elite hypothesis that public policy is an interest in elite policy-making. According to the elite paradigm, public policy represents the importance of people interest is just a myth and not a fact of a democratic society (Bozeman, 2002; Campbell, 2012). People have apathetic actions and do not have enough knowledge about public policy. The political elite views on the topics and structures used to shape policy advice, rather than public opinion, are the thoughts of the political elite (Chong and Druckman, 2007). The higher the elite level of politics, the greater the community concern about the system. The second model is a rigorous logical model, which shows that the political establishment prefers to quantify the benefits and drawbacks of enforcing a strategy. The will have the effect of defeats in executing the plan, the less likely it would be. One feature of this detailed realistic policy formulation model is the benefits and drawbacks of measuring the implementation policy and choosing programs with a more significant beneficial effect than other policy alternatives.

## **Methodology**

The study used a qualitative descriptive analysis to find evidence for the proper explanation (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). In the meantime, the explanatory model is an analysis that attempts to explain events (phenomena) in a formal, objective, and precise manner as to the reality, characteristics, and interaction between phenomena that are presently occurring (Yilmaz, 2013; Sousa, 2014). The study will take place over three months in 2019 and will occur in the Sinjai Regency. The sample position encompasses all groups in the Sinjai Local Parliament with the informant decision by way of an impartial sampling. The informants included are the administration and leadership of political parties with seats in the DPRD, the chairperson/deputy and members of the DPRD, and the secretary and staff of the DPRD.

Source data obtained contains primary and secondary data. Primary data gathered from DPRD representatives, faction members, and political party officials of the Sinjai Regency. They combined many complementary methods, including focus group dialogue (FGD) and participatory rural evaluation (PRA), in-depth interviews, and observation. Secondary data are taken from sources specific to this research, such as the DPRD Secretariat, DPRD faction staff, political party administrators, and other related organizations, to start gathering primary data in the field rather than pointing to the findings of previous studies. Supplement the precision of the primary data received and conducted through convenience sampling following study requirements (Pluye et al., 2009).

The data analysis method used is descriptive qualitative according to Seidel 1998, is an activity for collecting and generate field notes. The data source will still trace, gather and sort data, classify, synthesize, summarize, and index it. Create data categories and minimize or view data, and then draw inferences from earlier analysis findings such that the data analysis model used is a hybrid of Seiddel and Huberman (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

## **Results and Discussions**

### **Constituents Role on Policy Formulation in the Sinjai Parliament**

There is a propensity to be less successful with the recess execution, and it just seems to be a simple formality. Many DPRD participants perform a break at the end of time and as though they were aborting commitments. As a result, not all desires can be accommodated when they pushed for the session. In comparison, the bulk of DPRD representatives are also mostly not enough people who know what the content is and question the constituents. Vice versa or the electors do not realize what precisely they have to communicate with the representatives of the DPRD who are going to the recess. Therefore to maximize the usefulness of periods in catching the people desires, all sides should consider the substance of the issue that would occur in recess events.

The drawback of the recess made so far by DPRD members is that conflicts of interest between DPRD members and the group often exist when they do not take up the desires articulated during the break because do not obey their wishes. In comparison, recess is only carried out to abort the commitments.

It is certainly not possible to include voters directly in the policy formulation since voter position is restricted to the expression of desires. Ideally, democratic parties need to bridge the relationship between voters and groups in the DPRD, since the faction is an extension of the party. Any public policy-making action should include the society or the electorate, but in fact, what is happening is not the case. It is occurring because of a number of factors, like party concerns, such that it does not affect the constituents because of financial problems and the constituent perception of the position of factions that seem to be considered insufficient and ignorant.

One explanation that factions seldom include voters before formulating policies that they believe voters are not necessary and do not need to know about their formulating policies. However, the United States Organization for International Development (USAID) suggests that such aspects are helpful if the policy implementation includes constituents, including the expected gains (Fowler, 2013). First, it ensures that politicians who include their constituents allow societies with the government. Second, the direct participation of constituents represented. Its legislature has an active role to play in serving the city. However, not even the members of the legislature can satisfy the people desires they represent. In comparison, the third is the engagement and involvement of constituents. It ensures that politicians can mobilize citizen interest in public relations. The fourth argument is that the legislature voters will provide the members of the parliament itself with infinite rewards. Of the four points mentioned by USAID, it turns out that none of the legislative representatives of the Sinjai Regency are working optimally, so this is a hallmark of the constituents in the policy formulation. It is justified based on the legislators of *PartaiKebangkitanBangsa* (PKB) that we understand it is crucial to include the constituent aspiration mechanism before formed. However, we did not do so because of various reasons, including the focus that we meant was a narrow budget issue, while engaging voters would entail a great deal of budget (Interview, 2019).

The above statement demonstrates that the voter presence in the policy development process is a crucial determinant of the political will of the DPRD members. Therefore, as a recommendation, whether the electorate or the public involvement needs to improve, the DPRD representatives or factions in the DPRD should, before taking public policies, follow their aspirations by including all stakeholders in the framework they will create.

### **Political Party Participation on Policy Formulation in the Sinjai District Parliament**

Concerning the political parties involved the DPRD policy formulation it is not that different from the role of the constituents. They are not directly involved in the policy formulation process, but all have a role and a role to play in contributing to the DPRD hierarchy. All requests or support electorate must be made by political parties and then forwarded to the faction as an extension of the political parties. However, the party or the DPRD members are heading their way. They should not include political parties in any meeting or recessing ambitions. For the definitive explanation that political parties are concerned, the result is that the budget must be massive. On the other hand, the recess budget is not more than IDR 10,000,000 (ten million rupiahs) for a single recess.

Of the eleven political parties consulted related to their role in collecting voter aspirations, in general, they claimed that it was very rarely included in recessing by legislature members. They did not have hope-gathering because they found it incompetent to participate solely as a platform for nominating DPRD representatives applicants because of their duties. There is no longer any relationship with their members since the mission has been accomplished. There is no overt participation of political party in creation of policy directions. It is not a breach, of course, since there are no laws that govern, but at least how they are interested in collecting desires as a group with voters. Several leaders of the political parties that have DPRD legislative members were interviewed. Generally, they claimed that they had never participated in any recess activities of their legislative representatives, particularly those whose party leaders had not been members of the DPRD. The tendency was an indication that the party position appeared to be weak because those who sit as DPRD representatives are not leaders of their parties.

Based on the findings and research of the eleven parties interviewed, only three parties, or 27% of the political parties, were members of the DPRD. The balance was eight or 72%, not the heads of the DPRD. It is indicative of the low participation of political parties in policy-making and policy-making operations. A low political position in the policy formulation is one reason for the DPRD deep comprehension of the country philosophy and political structure. Whereas in the system theory put forth by David Easton, it is claimed that three processes are guiding the system execution, namely input, method, and output. The material involves community requests and encouragement, a mechanism that is nothing but a decision-making process, and productions relevant to the policy implementation process (Easton, 1965).

Besides, in his structure theory, Gabriel Almond states that it is surrounded by factors such as the existence of interest groups, political parties, governmental bodies, administrative bodies, bureaucracies, and judicial bodies (Almond, 2000). These components are connected to the input and output functions. This method input feature involves different elements, such as the articulation of interests, the grouping of interests, political socialization, political contact, and political recruitment. In comparison, there are elements in the production function, such as decision-makers, policy-makers, and policy adjudication.

Based on the two expert hypothesis there is a low degree of the political party participation in the policy formulation, and one explanation for this is the lack of awareness and perspective on the part of the legislative representatives and legislators. Education for members of the Sinjai DPRD, with information as follows: the Sinjai district DPRD members with high school education are already top 13 DPRD members or 43.33%, and those with a Bachelor degree are 11 or 36.66%. On the other hand, those with a master degree are five or 16%, while those with a doctorate or doctoral degree are one or 3.33%. The anomaly of the already high standard of the DPRD education participants equal to high school is one reason that has contributed to a low level of voter interest gathering of expectations at recess. Since almost all DPRD participants of educational backgrounds are hesitant or unwilling to face their pieces, they do not dare to talk in front of the forum and are concerned.

### **Factions Role on Policy Formulation in the Sinjai District Parliament**

The word faction is a concept used to refer to political parties/party groups in Government or the Parliament, or it is generally referred to as faction or coalition (McElroy and Benoit, 2010). The



sense of faction included a disciplinary aspect, which means that each legislature member would conform with the party rules or orders. Also, Park (2018) suggests that the factions are parties that compete for political power in the parliament or the council, or as a small part or fraction. Referring to some of the expert opinions, we can understand that the the faction position in the DPRD is undeniably essential. It is not a DPRD instrument but an extension of the party position to exert power over its members and fight for the political interests of it's the DPRD members and voters. Generally, the disparity in success is the same as the other groups of the local DPRD. However, the party performance is often heavily affected by the return of DPRD members themselves. The success of DPRD members is positively affected by the experience and education of DPRD members.

Many factors are determinants, like deciding the effectiveness of connections and the group success is a combined party or not a whole faction. The explanation is also that minor groups are hesitant to interact with the legislature members in the faction because they follow it. Even more so, if the faction leader is not of the same party, this is in line with what Rezki said (Interview, 2019). If it is not in line, the party must, of course, abide by the laws of the party itself by any member of the political party, including the leader of the faction. If not, the party can quickly recruit or dismiss a candidate who can immediately revoke his place as a legislature member.

If we refer to the above view, it can be ascertained that circumstances influenced the Sinjai Parliament combined factions. In such a way, the alliance party compiles it has become fragile and linked to this then the following can be seen as that of the eight factions in the Sinjai Parliament. There are 3 (three) or 37.5 % of the intact fraction, while the whole fraction is 5 or 62.5 %, as seen in Table 1. From the three merged factions listed above, the analysis outcomes and interviews carried out where the closeness of the party relationship to its fraction in the DPRD, which appears tiny. It is in line with the informant who said contact with the DPRD faction has become weak because the faction consisted of many groups, so we are a little hesitant to talk because we are a minority (Interview, September 2019).

Table 1  
 The Role of Factions on Policy Formulation in Sinjai District Parliament

Parliament Function	Faction Function
Legislation function	1. Give a proposal in preparing the regional legislation program. 2. Give a mini opinion at the end of conversation first level 3. Ask questions to DPOs representing the district head 4. Decision making of the Regional Regulation in deliberations 5. Make a statement of approval or rejection at the end of the second level of discussion.

The five functions listed above are the primary feature of the faction in the regional regulation policies formulation. It has been enforced in compliance with current legislation and regulations. However, the trend is only to carry out roles and obligations as a party since the institutional faction does not have the complete power to devise policies. However, faction maturity roles and duties have a dominant role; as proof, any operation of the DPRD leadership must often include faction leaders. On the other hand, groups are only an extension of political parties, not completeness (Ruland and Manea, 2013). The inference taken from this study is that the party

position in policy formulation is not essential. However, maturity party position has a superior task; this can be shown by the operation of the DPRD leadership; it must include faction.

### Policy Formulation Model in the Sinjai District Parliament

The study results indicate that the framework for relations between political parties and factions in the Sinjai local DPRD is weak. It has arisen due to the low participation of political parties by factions. Moreover, political party presence in the policy formulation is still low since the political party management perception of policy formulation is also low, as seen in Figure 1.

As a matter of course, the current processes and rules have been adopted in policy formulation at the DPRD level. However, the extent of political party participation in the gathering of constituent aspirations is still tiny. The strategy is not intended to encourage community donations. However, the best steps that must be taken by the DPRD members or the faction when addressing public policies must be listen to the electorate opinions or electorate by political parties. Besides, the concept or partnership model proposed it should be applied, as seen in Figure 2. Theoretically, to ensure that the government system continues to work, continuous feedback is necessary. The machine will not operate without input, and without output, we will not be able to define the system work (Markus, 1983). In this relation, it is essential to explore further the concept of inputs and the power to modify those inputs. Explore the process that converts these inputs into outputs, and connect them to the following results. One of the drawbacks of the DPRD policy formulation framework is that records, methods, and output are not accelerated. On the one hand, DPRD members or factions are not in line with political parties because the external ecological issues have not been given enough consideration.




Figure 1. The current relationship model

The policies implemented by the DPRD in local legislation, which are usually drawn from the Provincial Head and the Legislative or DPRD, have so far governed the executive local law. One of the reasons the mastery of public concerns more dominated by the executive than by the legislature.




Figure 2, The proposed relationship model or the model that should implement

### Justification and Description of the findings in Policy Formulation in the Sinjai Parliament

The rationale and suggestion of the policy formulation model presented in this study are one of the models developed to strengthen the policy formulation framework with a model involving constituents, relevant agencies, and political parties before developing a draft policy or regional legislation. It can be defined by following a system analysis theory proposed by David Easton partially classifying it into three main classes. It means input, method, and output determined by the political system internal and external ecological elements (Easton, 1965).

#### *Input Side (External)*

There is no new thing in the policy formulation framework adopted by the regional government by the legislature. It has been in service for many years as the country has a legislative body. However this does not mean that the machine is safe. It then definitely needs modifications and adjustments to achieve a better policy commodity, based on that argument. The following sub-systems would be partly defined concerning the policy-making process, with the following description:

#### **a. Society (Constituents)**

A successful policy is undoubtedly a policy that includes all elements of concern (stakeholders), one of the parties that play a crucial role in influencing public policy in the neighborhood or the constituents, even though their participation is not immediate. However, they require a input range, encouragement, or legislation that policy-makers need to make. The public aspiration for the policy proposal will be captured. The DPRD members or factions will take different steps as an extension political parties as pointed out in Table 1, which involves taking recesses, getting ambitions, working visits, focus group conversations, and public hearings. Of course, these practices are sources or inputs that would be the primary material for updating or formulating a policy or local legislation.

The trend that has taken place so far is that the legislative members, both individually and institutionally, are still ineffective in engaging people in the exercise of their ambitions. Therefore, it is also very formalistic, like holding recesses and work visits to its constituents. In a democracy, the inclusion of electors in the policy formulation is crucial because they are both the focus and the policy object. However, what happened in the Sinjai Parliament seems to have not been applied as much as possible. So what happens next is that the strategy that comes into being is not pro-people.

#### **b. Political Parties**

A political party is a political infrastructure that is one of the components or political sub-systems of society. It has a central role to play in the formulation of government policies. However, it is not explicitly interested in the formulation implementation. It must be active as bridge constituencies and divisions since the presence of factions in the DPRD is an extension of the party. Each must then synergize in any policy pre-formulation operation by presenting and collecting input on the regional legislation design to be made. One of the DPRD group shortcomings and weaknesses is that they do not motivate political parties as entities that play a strategic role in securing desires, even though they are constituent owners.

#### **c. Interest groups**

Community interest groups or social institutions are part of a political structure, and their existence must also be taken into account when it comes to appealing to public policy-makers. Typically, these people give guidance or criticism to decision-makers on issues perceived to be relevant to society needs through the application of aspirations, including as members of the DPRD participate in recess or collect aspirations and through protests and wish sent directly to the DPRD office. Procedurally, the current processes and rules have been followed in terms of policy formulation at the DPRD level. However, the level of political party participation in the gathering of constituent desires is still low. Consequently, initiatives do not encourage group donations. The best step to take when addressing national policies is to listen to the public viewpoints by political parties.

#### ***Process Side (Internal)***

In formulating public policy, the government must have two formal entities to do. The legislative and the executive, which are specifically governed both in the Indonesian Constitution, Law No. 23 of 2014, and the Parliament Law No. 17 of 2014, where both institutions have the right to apply a rule and then debate it to become a regional regulation. The following is quickly listed.

#### **a. Regional People Representative Assembly**

The DPRD, as a formal agency, is responsible for formulating regional policies as a legislative function by regional regulations. This work is carried out using all DPRD utilities, including factions, and by paying attention to the desires that grow in the society by preferences of political parties, NGOs, or all current stakeholders. In this policy formulation, of course, these two institutions have the right to introduce a plan for a municipal law and an initial draft. The DPRD

as the key participant along with the executive in formulating policies, those are supposed to stay transparent in obtaining desires from different elements in this field. The policies are implemented to represent people since both an object and a framework topic.

## **b. Executive**

As a legislative partner, the executive has an equitable role, including municipal regulatory policies, even though it has the same relatively stable location. However, it appears that the government part to submit the plan is much more important because, theoretically, they have more influence over issues in the area than the legislature. The executive purpose in formulating local regulatory policies is to become a DPRD partner so that they are supposed to have accurate knowledge and potential, then the DPRD may not overpower their position in formulating policies. The executive position has a dual role in the policy, both as a producer and executive.

## **Side OutPut (External Output)**

### **a. Policy or Local Regulation**

The final part of the policy formulation framework, especially in the production of local regulatory policies, is the performance of local regulation. The legislation is a legal product created by the regional authority and the DPRD, affecting different parties or stakeholders before implementing this regulation. It must be signed by the two actors that are the DPRD and the Government, in this case, the Regent, after it has been adopted or submitted, has consequently carried out socialization and has eventually applied to the population.

### **b. Recommendation**

The political party relationship model mentioned is a model developed to optimize the policy-making process to formulate regional regulations in Sinjai. The model is recommended for incorporating networks only before debating local legislation. They formed a relationship between the public, political parties, and social structures as a feedback receiver of desires or factions before addressing the local regulations in the DPRD.

## **Conclusion**

The relationship between political parties and factions seems weak, so the Sinjai DPRD policy formulation tends to be an elite model. It is defined by measures that do not incorporate the undercurrent (constituents and political parties), leading to a less successful application of the policy-making model without the need for citizens and political parties. Until formulating policies with vague templates, coordination between political parties and voters was poor. It is vital to strengthen the interaction between political parties and factions in the DPRD, which characterizes the policy formulation paradigm adopted by developing new models governed by improper regulations.

The process of recess implementation carried out by the parties before joining the trial phase has been introduced. However, a tendency to be less productive and appear formalistic since the extent of engagement of electors and political parties in the process of collecting the people

desires is superficial. Because several budgets are needed in the process of filtering aspirations affecting voters and political parties, on the other hand, the budget for recess is low, so that recess is carried out as a formal practice but with minimal expectations.

It is crucial to establish and strengthen the relationship between factions and political parties in policy formulation. However, it is not in the role of the key players that voters and political parties are involved in the policy formulation, but as a source of ambition to provide input, recommendations, requests, or support from the people particularly in the Sinjai Parliament into the political structure.

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